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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
Mark S. McQuality* and Eliot Shavin **
HIS Article surveys developments under Texas law in the area of
creditor and consumer rights during the period November 1989
through November 1990. During the period, Texas courts issued a
number of significant decisions in this broad and diverse field of law. The
number and variety of cases makes it impractical to adequately address all
case law developments in this area. Therefore, only select decisions which
significantly impact consumers, both business and individual, and their cred-
itors are reviewed below.
I. USURY AND THE DTPA
On November 14, 1990, the Texas Supreme Court rendered a substituted
opinion in Kinerd v. Colonial Leasing Co.,I withdrawing its prior opinion of
June 20, 1990.2 This case involves an action for damages under both the
usury statute3 and the Deceptive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA).4 Kinerd is an appropriate case to begin this Survey, not only
due to its tremendous legal significance, but also because of the large number
of businesses in Texas it may impact. Kinerd examines the requisites for
holding a lease to be usurious, the proper measure of damages in DTPA and
usury cases, and the unconscionability of a third-party lender greatly
overcharging for equipment.
Mike Kinerd purchased equipment manufactured by Radiator Aid, Inc.
Radiator Aid told Kinerd that he could buy the equipment directly from the
manufacturer for cash or from Colonial Leasing Company (Colonial) under
an arrangement involving payments over time. Kinerd elected the latter
manner of acquisition, which is often called a third-party lease. Radiator
Aid sold the equipment to Colonial for $10,000, and Colonial entered into a
lease agreement with Kinerd. The lease agreement obligated Kinerd to
make 60 monthly payments to Colonial and forbade prepayment. In the
* Partner, Bragg, Chumlea, McQuality, Smithers & Curry, Dallas, Texas; J.D. South-
ern Methodist University, 1977; B.A. University of Illinois, 1974.
** Solo Practitioner, Dallas, Texas; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1980; B.A. Haverford
College, 1975.
1. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 92 (Nov. 14, 1990), rev'g 733 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1987).
2. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 585 (June 20, 1990).
3. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 - 1.12 (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp.
1991).
4. TEx. Bus. & COM. CoDE ANN. §§ 17.41 - .63 (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp. 1991).
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event of a default, the lease required immediate payment of all remaining
installments. After remitting all 60 payments, Kinerd obtained the right to
purchase the equipment for $1.00.
The jury found that the transaction between Kinerd and Colonial was a
loan and that Colonial committed usury.5 The jury also found Colonial ac-
ted unconscionably by greatly overcharging Kinerd for the equipment.6 The
Eastland court of appeals reversed, holding that no evidence existed to sus-
tain the jury's findings on either the DTPA or usury claims.7
The Texas Supreme Court, in its original opinion of June 20, 1990, re-
viewed the three essential elements of a usurious transaction: (1) a loan of
money; (2) an absolute obligation to repay principal; and (3) exaction of a
greater compensation than allowed by law for the use of money.8 Finding
evidence of each of these elements, the court reversed the court of appeals. 9
In a substituted opinion issued on November 14, 1990, the supreme court
came to the same conclusion, but traveled a different route to reach its deci-
sion. The substituted opinion eliminated the discussion and analysis of the
essential elements of a usurious transaction, and instead, focused on Article
506910 and the time-price differential doctrine.
Article 5069 controls the amount of interest that may be legally charged
in Texas." The statute consists of three subtitles: the first subtitle deals
with loans, containing general provisions and definitions on interest, 12 and
the remaining two subtitles pertain to the regulation of consumer loans, cer-
tain kinds of credit sales, and consumer protection. 13 The supreme court
noted that the court of appeals did not discuss Kinerd's judgment for usury
penalties, except to hold that the transaction was not a retail installment sale
subject to regulation under Subtitle Two--Consumer Credit. 14 Chief Justice
Phillips, writing for the court, agreed with this conclusion, but noted it failed
to resolve the usury question.' 5
The court properly focused on Kinerd's claim that the transaction was
subject to the provisions of Subtitle One, and Colonial's response that the
usury statute does not apply because the transaction did not involve interest
charges. 16 The controlling issue, therefore, was whether Colonial's sale of
the equipment to Kinerd was a credit sale for a time-price differential. If so,
the transaction could not be usurious because the definition of interest in the
5. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 93.
6. Id.
7. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Kinerd, 733 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987),
rey'd 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 92 (Nov. 14, 1990).
8. Kinerd v. Colonial Leasing Co., 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 585, 586 (June 20, 1990).
9. Id. at 587.
10. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp. 1991).
11. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 93.
12. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01 - 1.12 (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp.
1991) (Subtitle One-Interest).
13. Id., arts. 5069-2.01 - 8.06 (Subtitle Two--Consumer Credit) and arts. 5069-9.01 -
51.17 (Subtitle Three-Consumer Protection).
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first subtitle excludes "any time-price differential however denominated aris-
ing out of a credit sale." 17
The Texas legislature has acted to regulate certain transactions involving
time-price differentials.18 That legislation, however, is not applicable to the
commercial sale of equipment.19 The court, therefore, applied the common
law to determine whether the transaction between Kinerd and Colonial
qualified as a bona fide credit sale under the time-price differential
doctrine. 20
.Application of the time-price doctrine requires proof of three elements:
(1) the seller clearly offered to sell the goods for both a cash price and a
credit or time price; (2) the purchaser was aware of the two offers; and (3)
the purchaser knowingly chose the higher time price.21 Even when these
elements exist, however, if a party presents evidence indicating the entire
scheme is actually designed to avoid usury laws, a question of fact is raised
for the jury.22 In the trial court the jury, following an instruction that cor-
rectly defined a time-price differential, answered that Colonial's profit on the
resale of the equipment was not a time-price differential. 23 The jury further
found that the transaction was a means for making a loan.24 The loan prin-
cipal was $10,000 and Kinerd promised to repay $16,909.20. Applying the
jury's findings to the terms of the lease agreement, the trial court calculated
that the agreement between Colonial and Kinerd incorporated a rate of in-
terest more than twice that allowed by law;25 Kinerd, consequently, was en-
titled to the statutory penalties for usury.26
The supreme court also examined several important DTPA issues in.
Kinerd. First the court evaluated Colonial's liability under Section 17.50 of
the DTPA for its own unconscionable conduct in grossly overcharging for
the equipment. 27 The Eastland court of appeals, reversing the trial court
DTPA judgment against Colonial, held that Colonial was not responsible for
the actions or misrepresentations of Radiator Aid.28 The court of appeals,
however, did not discuss the unconscionability argument raised by Kinerd.
The supreme court commented on the jury's findings that Colonial uncon-
scionably overcharged Kinerd by selling the equipment for $10,000, while1
17. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a), (d) (Vernon 1987).
18. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-6.01(h) (Vernon 1987) (retail install-
ment sales) and 5069-7.01(i) (Vernon 1987) (motor vehicle installment sales).
19. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 94.
20. See Rotello v. International Harvester Co., 624 S.W.2d 249, 250-51 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 94.
22. See Butler v. Holt Mach. Co., 741 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1987,
writ denied).
23. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 94.
24. Id.
25. The lease provided for payment of 60 monthly installments of $268.40 excluding
taxes. Amortizing a principal of $10,000 over this payment schedule results in an interest rate
of 20.62%.
26. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1), (2) (Vernon 1987).
27. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987).
28. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 95.
1991]
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the actual value of the goods received was only $2,000.29 The supreme court
found some evidence to support the jury's findings and remanded Kinerd's
DTPA claim to the court of appeals to consider Colonial's factual insuffi-
ciency contention.30
Finally, the supreme court addressed the proper computation of damages
in Kinerd. The court held that Kinerd's usury and DTPA claims covered
different aspects of the transaction and the damages arising from the sepa-
rate acts did not overlap.31 Colonial committed a deceptive trade practice
when it sold the equipment and also charged a usurious rate of interest when
it financed the sale.3
2
II. ACCELERATION CLAUSES
Acceleration clauses continue to be a minefield of strict construction by
the Texas courts. Two contrasting decisions concerning acceleration clauses
reported during the survey period reflect the critical importance of careful
drafting by counsel preparing the loan documents. In Brookshire v. Long-
horn Chevrolet Co. 33 two automobile buyers brought a class action lawsuit
for statutory penalties under the Consumer Credit Code34 against the seller
and the bank that provided installment financing. The consumers alleged
that the acceleration clause in their retail installment contracts was usurious
because the clause contained a contingency by which the lender could re-
ceive more than the lawful rate of interest. The acceleration clause provided
that "[i]n the event of default the entire unpaid balance of the Total of Pay-
ments shall at the option of the seller become immediately due and paya-
ble."' 35 The buyers argued, and the court agreed, that the clear language of
the contract accelerated the unpaid balance of the Total of Payments. The
clause was held to be usurious because it authorized the lender to collect
unearned time-price differential, plus remaining interest, in the event of de-
fault.36 The court noted that a similar acceleration clause was found usuri-
ous in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chasteen37 and that the appellees had
failed to distinguish, or even discuss, that opinion in their brief.38
In contrast, an acceleration clause with similar wording was found not
29. Id.
30. Id. See Putnam v. Missouri Valley, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex. 1981).
31. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 95.
32. This analysis is proper and distinguishable from a decision reported in last year's sur-
vey, Hardwick v. Austin Gallery of Oriental Rugs, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989, writ denied). Recovery of damages under both the DTPA and usury may be proper if
the damages are for separate acts. Section 17.43 of the DTPA specifically allows cumulative
recovery of DTPA penalties when penalties are awarded under another statute for different
acts or practices. In Hardwick the court concluded the jury's findings referred simply to one
act and its cause.
33. 788 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1990, no writ).
34. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-2.01 - 8.06 (Vernon 1987 & Vernon Supp.
1991).
35. 788 S.W.2d at 211 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 212.
37. 565 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. 788 S.W.2d at 212.
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usurious in Myles v. Resolution Trust Corp.39 Myles brought an action
against La Hacienda Savings and Loan Association to recover statutory pen-
alties on several allegedly.usurious notes. The language of the notes allowed
acceleration of the note total upon default. The court, stressing the pre-
sumption of legality and reading the notes as a whole, found the default and
acceleration language nonusurious.40 The court commented that the direc-
tional and definitional sections in the notes affirmatively stated that interest
accrued over the life of the loan.41 Also the court cited the savings clause
and rebate clause as strengthening the nonusurious construction.42
III. FORECLOSURES AND GUARANTEES
During the survey period two significant cases dealt with foreclosure and
guaranty issues. As befits the times, in both cases the creditor was the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).43 The defendant in each case
raised the defense of a breach of the duty of good faith. In both cases the
FDIC won. Although one might suppose that these defendants were
doomed44 by the doctrine established in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,45
the doctrine is not mentioned. Rather the cases seem to open the door, ever
so slightly, to the possibility of a successful defense to a collection suit
brought by the FDIC.
In FDIC v. Nobles the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed, without
deciding, that a duty of good faith to preserve the collateral exists.46 The
court further assumed, without explicitly saying, that the FDIC could be
held to have violated such a duty in the appropriate case.47 Nobles, however,
was not such a case.
Nobles signed a continuing guaranty of all indebtedness owed by
Swivelbar, Inc. to Western Bank of Midland, Texas (Western). Swivelbar
executed a promissory note to Western on the same day and pledged all of
its inventory and accounts receivable to Western as security. Western failed
to perfect its security interest in the inventory and accounts receivable by
omitting to file a financing statement. The FDIC, who acquired the note and
the guaranty when it became the receiver for Western, also failed to file a
financing statement before the inventory was seized by a judgment creditor
and sold at a sheriff's sale.
When Swivelbar and Nobles defaulted on the note and the guaranty, re-
spectively, the FDIC sued Nobles. The trial court, granting the motion for
summary judgment filed by the FDIC, held that the guaranty itself pre-




43. See FDIC v. Nobles, 901 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706
(Tex. 1990).
44. A pun is intended.
45. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).




cluded any good faith defense. The court stated further that the FDIC owed
no such duty to Nobles.48
Although guarantors or borrowers may find little solace, the case is signifi-
cant upon consideration that the creditor was the FDIC. No mention of
D'Oench is made in Nobles. Thus, one might infer that if such a good faith
defense exists, D'Oench does not preclude it. Of course, this inference is
speculation based on the lack of any reference to the dreaded D'Oench doc-
trine in the Nobles opinion. Borrower's and guarantor's counsel must look
for solace wherever they can find it.
Three weeks after Nobles, the Texas Supreme Court closed the door a bit
further. In FDIC v. Coleman the court rejected the idea that a duty of good
faith or fair dealing obligates a secured creditor to foreclose its lien promptly
after the debtor's default on the note.49 The guarantor/defendants in Cole-
man alleged that the FDIC increased their liability on the guarantees by
delaying foreclosure and sale of the property securing the note when the
FDIC knew the market value of the property was declining.50
The dissenting opinion of Justice Mauzy objected to the majority's charac-
terization of the defendants' claim as one of good faith and fair dealing.51
Instead, Justice Mauzy noted that "[defendants] pled and argued this case
on a theory of 'commercial reasonableness.' "52 In fact, the characterization
of the defense as one of good faith and fair dealing seems to be belied by the
majority's own rejection of the defendants' UCC claim because the claim
was not one of good faith but a lack of diligence. 5 3 Thus the majority appar-
ently created a straw man to tear down rather than address the viable de-
fense of commercial reasonableness raised by the defendants. In so doing,
the court leaves open the possibility that a commercial reasonableness de-
fense under the UCC might be available to guarantors and borrowers even
when the FDIC is the secured creditor, notwithstanding D'Oench.
IV. LENDER LIABILITY
When D'Oench is raised by the FDIC or Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC) in state court, even after the case is appealed, the
doctrine bars all defenses and claims based on misrepresentations or actions
not revealed in the bank's records. 54 The Dallas court of appeals rejected or
distinguished one Houston court of appeals case5s and three United States
48. Id. at 479.
49. 795 S.W.2d at 707.
50. Id. at 708.
51. Id. at 711.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 708. "[Defendants'] complaint in this case is not that the FDIC was dishonest,
but that it was not diligent. The UCC does not require diligence for good faith." Id.
54. See FSLIC v. T. F. Stone - Liberty Land Ass'n, 787 S.W.2d 475, 482 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ granted); FDIC/Manager Fund v. Larsen, 793 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ granted).
55. FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-Houston (st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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Court of Appeals cases56 in its opinion.5 7 In Stone the FSLIC became the
receiver for the insolvent defendant eighteen days after the trial court had
entered its judgment, but the FSLIC did not raise the D'Oench defenses until
twelve days after the judgment became final. In Larsen the FSLIC did not
acquire the assets of the failed bank until more than a year after the trial
court entered its judgment. Despite this important distinction, the court
held that regardless of whether federal defenses were preserved for appeal,
they can be raised if the judgment is appealable. 58 Since the supreme court
granted writ of error in both of these cases, an open question remains as to
when the D'Oench doctrine can be raised for the first time.
56. Thurman v. FDIC, 889 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1989); Olney Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Trinity
Banc Sav. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1989); Grubb v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151 (loth Cir.
1989). Grubb was called into doubt by Rayman v. Peoples Say. Corp., 735 F. Supp. 842 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
57. 787 S.W.2d at 481-85.
58. 793 S.W.2d at 42.
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